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Summary  findings
Huizinga and Nielsen investigate the optimal boundary  invests more in those activities than the private sector
between the public and private production  sectors. They  would. Generally the size of the government sector is
use a model in which government and private production  related positively to the investment tax wedge.
coexist - in which a range of production  activities can  The level of investment taxes - and thus the size of
be carried out by either the government or the private  the state production  sector - may be affected by tax
sector.  competition in the international economy. As
In effect, the government determines which activities  international capital becomes more mobile, there seems
to maintain within the public sector and which to  to be more scope for international  (investment) tax
privatize. In choosing the sectoral boundary, the  competition. As a result of tax competition, perhaps,
government trades off the relative inefficiency of  corporate income tax rates have been on a downward
marginal government production  against the private  trend in European countries. In Europe, the general
investment distortion created by tax policy.  lowering of corporate income tax rates has coincided
In an open economy, the private investment decision is  with a trend toward privatizing government activities.
distorted by a source-based income tax. In a closed  Huizinga and Nielsen focus on the relationship
economy, the private investment decision is distorted by  between capital income taxes and the size of the
either a private investment tax or a savings tax. Either  government production  sector. Analogously, one could
tax produces a wedge between the gross return on  consider the relationship between labor income taxes and
investment and the net-of-tax return  received by savers.  the size of the state sector. In that instance, the model
Because of this tax wedge, the private cost of capital  predicts that a formerly state-owned enterprise, after
exceeds the shadow cost of public capital.  privatization, reduces its payroll. Privatization also seems
Optimally, the government sector is shown to be "too  to lead to reduced employment levels.
large" in the sense that the government carries out some  These results hold in both open economy and closed
activities in which it has an efficiency disadvantage and  economy versions of the model.
the private sector has an efficiency advantage. And it
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Historically and across countries,  there has been a wide variation  in the relative  importance
of public production. Traditionally,  the share of government production in total output has been
larger in developing countries than in industrialized countries, with the exception  of the centrally
planned economies. In recent years, there has been a strong tendency to privatize state-owned
enterprises around the world, thereby reducing  the share of public production. Wholesale  privatiza-
tion has been underway in Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism. More subtly, the
United Kingdom has reduced  the share of public production of goods and services  for sale in GDP
from 6.6 percent in 1982 to 1.9 percent in 1991, compared to a share of 0.6 percent in the United
States in 1987, and a share of 10.0 in a 'statist' country like France in 1988.' Worldwide,  privatiza-
tion occurs in the belief that it will increase production efficiency  and produce  welfare  gains. Some
detailed  evidence indeed  supports  this view (see Boardman and Vining (1989) for a survey).
The present trend towards privatization somewhat obscures the underlying and enduring
question of what is the appropriate  role of governrnent  in production. In 1776  Adam Smith  thought
that private enterprise was the preferred mode of production. Considering the privatization  of
crown lands, he writes: "When  the crown lands had become private property, they would, in the
course of a few years, become well improved and well cultivated." 2 Following experiences  with
excessive capitalism in the 19th century in England and elsewhere, Keynes in 1927  appears to be
more  of  a  pragmatist. Considering the boundary between the private and public sectors, he
remarks: "The line of demarcation  between the two is constantly changing in accordance  with the
practical needs of the day. As to where precisely this line should be drawn no great question  of
principle is involved." 3 Current  thinking largely remains pragmatic, although  some principles  have
been enunciated. In a thoughtful essay on the role of the state, Stiglitz (1989) argues that the
relative attractiveness of public ownership and production depends on the importance  of market
failures vs. public failures. Failures in either sector can arise on account of a lack of competition,
imperfect information,  and incomplete  markets. A source of public failures, in addition,  may be a
government's inability  to bind its future actions. Along these lines, several papers have formalized
the choice between private and public production. Shapiro and Willig (1990), and Hart, Schleifer,
and Vishny (1996) focus on the market failure of incomplete contracts; Bos and Peters (1991)
consider the market failure of imperfect  competition; finally, Schmidt (1996) considers  the public
failure  of uncomritting  governments. While these papers are  insightful, they do not  offer a
workable explanation  of, say, cross-country  variation in the importance  of public production.  The
1reason is that countries  unable to remedy market failures probably are the same countries  unable  to
remedy public failures.
An important 'market failure,' so far overlooked in this debate, is the taxation  of private
production by way of income and other taxes. This paper presents a model that explores the
implications  of taxation for the optimal  boundary between the private and public sectors. There is
assumed to be a continuum  of production  activities that in principle can be in the private or public
sectors. Unspecified  market and public failures for each activity determine  the production  efficiency
of the private sector relative to the public sector, in the absence of any taxation. The public goods
nature of defense  and the courts, for instance, implies that these activities  are best carried out by the
public sector. Contracting  problems in the public sector, on the other hand, imply that fast food
restaurants are best left to the private sector. Other imnportant  activities such as education,  health
services and  infrastructure  construction and operation, are somewhere in the middle. The key
question is where is the optimal dividing line between the public and private sectors. The line of
demarcation, in practice, moves following  privatization  or public take-overs.
The set of tax instruments  is assumed to consist of an investment  tax, a saving tax, and a
non-distorting,  but limited profit tax. The government  jointly determines  tax policy, privatization,
and  the  level of  capital investment for publicly-owned activities. The analysis yields several
insights. First, the private and public sector each contain those activities where they have an
absolute efficiency  advantage, if there is no need for distorting taxes on private production.  This is
the case if the profit tax yields  the government  sufficient tax revenue. Second, the public sector  will
be  "too large" in the sense that it carries out some activities where it has an absolute efficiency
disadvantage, if there is a need for distorting investment  taxation. The investment  tax renders the
private mode of production relatively less attractive, prompting government production  to expand
into territory where it has a non-tax related efficiency disadvantage. Generally, the size of the
public sector is shown to increase with the marginal investment tax distortion. This paper thus
provides an economic,  non-ideological  rationale for the simultaneous  reduction of tax burdens and
the privatization  of state-owned  enterprises. At the same time, the analysis  begins to offer explana-
tions for the observed variation in the relevance of public production around the world. Highly
distortive tax systems in developing countries, for instance, may explain a prevalence of public
ownership and production. In addition, international  tax competition,  to the extent that it explains
reductions in corporate income  tax levels, also explains privatization  in the industrialized  countries.
Finally, cross-counr.-: >!riation in preferences for  public goods or  redistribution  can explain
2different tax levels and state production  sectors.
An important focus of the paper is the appropriate level of public investment,  thereby
extending a sizable literature on the shadow value of public capital (see, for instance, Diamond  and
Mirrlees (1971a,b), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1972), Sandmo and Dreze (1971), Hagen (1988) and
Stiglitz (1982)). This paper confirms the earlier insight of Sandmo and Dreze (1971) that the
appropriate shadow  cost of public capital is between the gross return to capital in the private sector,
and the net-of-tax return received by savers. This is shown to imply that the government  invests
more capital in its marginal production activity than the private sector would. As an implication,
privatization  is accompanied  by a shedding  of capital.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 present the model for the
case of a small open economy,  with access  to the international  capital  market. In the open economy,
the shadow cost of public capital is trivially equal to the international  interest rate. Next, section  3
analyses the closed  economy  case where all private and public investment  are financed  by domestic
saving. In this setting, the shadow cost of public capital is shown to reflect the scale of ongoing
privatization. Specifically,  ongoing privatization  moves the shadow cost of public capital closer  to
the cost of capital in the private sector, and away from the net-of-tax  return received  by investors.
The insight regarding the enlargement  of the public sector following  the introduction  of distorting
taxes in the private sector remains  valid in this setting. Finally, section  4 concludes  by pointing  out
how the model applies  to taxation  generally  rather than just capital income  taxation, and it discusses
possible empirical applications.
2.  Privatizanon in the small open economy
Consider a two-period  framework for a small open economy that takes the international
interest rate, r, as given. The economy can produce a single, composite  good by way of a range  of
production activities or projects. The total volume of existing production projects is unity. All
projects can in principle be carried out either by the public or by the private sector, albeit with
generally different technologies.  If in the private sector, a project's output  if F(K), where K is the
project's first-period  output and F(K) the second-period  output. If in the public sector, the project's
output is (1 - c)  F(K), where ca is the project's relative public waste parameter. This parameter
stands for non-tax  factors  determining  the relative production  efficiency  of the two sectors. With co
>  0, the project yields higher output in the private sector (for a given capital input), and vice
versa. The parameter ca is distributed on the interval [f,  G3]  (with W <  0 <  ca), with a density
3function h(co)  and a corresponding  distribution function  H(CO).
Below, the public (private) sector specializes in operating projects with low (high) waste
parameters Ca. Let G denote the marginal public project that demarcates the line between the two
sectors. With G =  0, each sector carries out the production activities where it has an absolute
efficiency advantage, while with G  >  0 (6  <  0) the government sector is  "too large" ("too
small"). The boundary waste parameter CS  is affected by  ongoing privatization, or conversely,
public take-overs  of previously  private projects. Hence, the post-privatization  boundary, G, may be
different from the original  marginal  waste parameter, denoted 60, which reflects  original public  and
private project endowments.  With 63  <  60, privatization  indeed  takes place.
In  the first period, the representative agent receives an  endowment  of the single good
denoted Y. These resources  are divided between first-period consumption,  C,, and saving, S. In the
second period, there is private consumption,  C 2, and consumption  of a public good, G. This public
good is  a  one-to-one transformation  of the  single produced good, and it does not affect the
economy's private or public production capacity. To finance the public good, the government  can
impose a private investment  tax at a rate v, and a saving tax at a rate u, both payable in the second
period. In addition,  second-period  private profits are taxed at a rate z, while  public profits accrue to
the government directly. We assume that the investment tax is deductible from taxable profits.
Profits can be thought to reflect some project-specific fixed factor such as land or  labor. The
feasible profit tax, z, is assumed  to be limited to the range 0 ￿  z ￿  z  <  1. The upper limit on the
profit tax may reflect, among  other things, that profit taxes beyond a certain  level are evaded.
The ordering  of events is as follows. First, the government decides  on tax rates, the extent
of privatization,  and public investment  levels. Next, private agents make their first-period  consump-
tion, saving and private investment  decisions. Finally, in the second period the government  collects
taxes, receives payment for any privatized projects, and production and consumption  take place.
We will assume that the government requests competitive bids for any projects it wishes to
privatize. As a result, the payment  that the government receives for privatized  projects is equal to
the (after-tax)  profits of the projects after privatization  as follows,
P  = (o  - Cp) (I  - z) [F(K.)  - (I  + r  v)K  ]  (1)
where  K.  is  the  private  capital  investmnent  at  any  private  project,  and  ap = I  - H(0)
p
[o0  =I  - H(00) ]  is the share of projects in private hands after [before] privatization.  These
4shares are loosely  referred to as the post- and pre-privatization  sizes of the private sector.
The two-period  budget  constraint  of the representative  household  can be stated  as follows,
C2 5I  + r  - u)  (Y,  - Cl)  +  Orp(I  - z)[F(Kp)  - (I  + r  + v)Kp]  - P  (2)
Second-period consumption,  C 2,  thus reflects first-period saving, second-period  after-tax
profits and the payment to the governznent  for any privatized activities.
The government's  second-period  budget constraint is as follows,
G  5uS  + Of[z[F(Kp)  -(I  + r  + v)KV]  + vK  ]  +
J(  I  - w)  F (K  (w))  - (I  + r)  Kg ()J  h (4)  do)  + P  (3)
where  Kg(6w) is the investment  at a particular public-sector  project. On the income  side in (3), the
government receives saving, profit and investment  tax revenues and the profits from publicly-run
projects plus the sales receipts  from privatized  activities.
The lifetime utility function  has an additive form given by U(C,, C2)  +  V(G). In the first
period,  the representative  household makes saving and investment  decisions, giving rise to the
following  familiar optimality  conditions:
U,  =  (1  +  r  - u)  U2 (4)
F' ()-  (I  + r + v) = 0  (5)
Eq.  (5) immediately  implies that the private investment, K., is negatively related to the
investment tax, v, for any private-sector  project. Aggregate private and public investments,  k(p  and
Kg, are given by,
K  = o  K  (6) p  p  p
5K8  lkg(i)Jh(W)dw  7
To shorten notation, let F  (Kg, O) be the maximum public output for a given aggregate
government capital, it,,  and projects with waste parameters X  E [w, (5] in the state sector. Note
that maximizing government  output F  (Kg, MD)  (for a given capital stock Kg) implies  that the post-
waste  marginal product of  capital,  (I  - C)  F '(Kg())),  is  constant for  all public projects.
Specifically, we have (1  - w) F /(Kg (w))  = (I  -e)  F /(Kg(0))  = dF(Kg, Q) /dK,  for all w  s  6.
This implies that the level of public investment,  K.((i),  for any government  project  X can be written
as Kg (w)  =  (F /)-((1  -F ))  F(Kg (a))) / (I -w), given an investment, 4 (X), in the marginal  public
project with waste parameter 0.  An immediate  implication  is that the public investment,  Kg(@),  for
any public project is negatively  related to the waste parameter, (.
Given the private first order conditions  (4) and (5), the government  wishes  to maximize  the
utility of the representative  household, subject to its budget constraint in (3). The government's
choice variables are the tax rates u,  v, and z,  the volume of public goods, G, the boundary
parameter, c3, and the investment  level in the marginal public activity Kg(@) (given its linkage to
investment levels in other public  projects). The government's problem  corresponds  to the following
Lagrangean,
L  =  U(Cl, (YJ  - Cl) (I  + r  - u)  + Oa  (I  - z) f F(Kp)  -(I  r  + v) K  -P)  +
V(G)  + A(uS +  or[z[F(Kp,)  - (1  + r  + v)KpJ  + vKp]  +
_~~~  ~ ~  _
F(Kg, O)  + P  - G)  (8)
where I  is the Lagrange  multiplier  associated  with the government  budget  constraint. 4
Rather trivially, the government  optimally applies the profit tax, z, to the maximurn  before
resorting to distorting saving and investment  taxation. Below, therefore, we consider  the govern-
ment's problem of choosing  the optimal values of u, v, (,  Kg((3), and G for a given (maximum)
profit tax, z. The corresponding  optimality  conditions are given by,
- U 2 +  A(1  - ue.)  =0  (9)
6-U2(1  -z)  +1((I  -z)(I  + up)  -pe,v)  =0  (10)
(I  -)  FF(Kg  (0))  (I  + r) Kg(o)  - [F(KJ,  - (I  +  r)K]  0  (11)
(1  - t)F (Kg(0))  -(I  + r)  = 0  (12)
V'(G)  - i  =0  (13)
where eu = -ISIS  0  0 is the uncompensated  semi-elasticity  of saving with respect to the saving
du  dK
tax,  u  (which is assumed positive at a maximum in (9));  e,,  = -- 1K > 0  is the semi-elasticity of
dv
private investment  with respect  to the investment  tax, v; p is the marginal  propensity  to consume  in
the first period out of second-period  income;  and p = ap/d.  is the relative  post-privatization  size of
the private sector. Note that p >  1 implies  ongoing privatization.
Eqs. (9) and (10) rather directly  yield the following optimal  tax formulae,
u =  - (I  -)  (14)
v  =  -(I  -- )  (15)
P ev  eu  77
where  ri  =A/U2  is  the  marginal  cost  of  funds;  and  e  e  =e+  p  is  the  compensated  semi-
elasticity of saving with respect to the tax u.  In standard fashion, eqs. (14) and (15) relate the
optimal saving and investment  taxes to the saving and investment elasticities.  More interestingly,
eq. (15) further indicates  that the optimal  investment  tax is negatively  related  to the relatively  post-
privatization size of the private sector, p.  In words, the government is ill-advised  to levy a high
investment tax on private projects, if many of these are newly-privatized.  To see why, first note
that a higher investment  tax on privatized  projects by the same amount reduces the sales revenue,
P, at the time of privatization  - for a given private investment  level, Kp. A higher investment  tax,
however, discourages private investment,  thereby reducing the payment, P, by more than the
additional  investment  tax revenue intake.
Next,  optimality condition (11) guides  the  government's privatization decision. The
condition reflects that,  with competitive project pricing,  privatization only influences private
welfare indirectly through its effe.:  eni the public budget. In fact, at the optimum the overall
7revenue to the govermment  is maximized. This implies the marginal project's surplus, if in the
public sector, equals the project's pre-tax profits, if in the private sector. In (11), however, it is
again important to note that private investment,  K., is negatively related to the investment  tax, v.
This  relationship in effect links the government's optimal tax and privatization problems. To
evaluate (11), let us first assume that the available profit tax yields the government  sufficient  tax
revenues.  This  implies that  ;7 = 1,  and u  =  v  =  0.  Eq.  (5)  and (11) together  then  immediately
yield that the optimal  boundary parameter cD  equals zero. In this case, there is overall  production
efficiency, with each of the two sectors holding the projects where it has an absolute  production
advantage.
More realistically,  we next assume that the government has to resort to positive  values of
the saving and investment  taxes, u and v, because the marginal cost of public funds, 7, exceeds
unity. For this case, we can show: 5
Proposition  1. In the open economy,  the optimal  privatization  choice implies
(i)  C>  Oif  77> 1,
(ii)  Kg(O)  > Kp if  7 >  I,
(iii)  v and t; are positively  related.
For a proof, see the Appendix. Part (i) of the proposition states that the public sector will
be  "too large" in that it comprises  some projects where it has an absolute efficiency  disadvantage
with Tj  >  I  . Thus the 'market failure' of investment  taxation is balanced  by the 'public failure' df
a marginally inefficient  public sector. Part (ii) states that the public sector invests more capital in
the  marginal public  project  than  the  private  sector  with  i1  >  1.  Equivalently, there  is
underinvestment of capital in the marginal private project because of the investment  tax. The
investment level for all projects, as related to the public waste parameter cl, are represented  in
Figure  1. The figure reflects the private-sector underinvestment at the marginal and all other
projects. Confirming  the private underinvestment  result, Moore (1970)  provides some evidence  that
public utilities are more capital-intensive  than private utilities. Public utilities, specifically,  are
shown to have a higher ratio of electricity  generating  capacity to peak demand than private  utilities.
Note that part (ii) also implies that the owners of a newly privatized firm will lay off some of the
project's capital. Finally, part (iii) indicates  that the investment  tax, v, and the boundary  parameter,
0i, are positively related. In words, the optimal size of the public sector is positively  related  to -.'e
8tax burden on private production. Governments that reduce taxes thus should also be seen to
privatize public enterprises  for economic, non-ideological  reasons.
The linkage between the tax burden on private production and the government's optimal
involvement in production  has a variety of implications for the optimal  scale of public production.
Essentially, the economy's underlying  technology  and preferences, insofar as they  justify high taxes
on private production activity, also warrant a large government production sector. In the model
under consideration,  technological  and preference parameters can be related  to tax and privatization
policy as follows,
Proposition  2.
(i)  For given values  of e.c, (1 - z)/ev, and p, a higher value of ri leads  to larger u, v and 6.
(ii)  For given values  of e4',  p,  T1,  a higher value of (1 - z)/le increases  v and 2S  while  u remains
the same.
(iii)  For given values  of (1 -z)/ev,  p, and rq,  a higher value of euf  reduces  u and v and B.
These results follow rather  immediately from  eqs.  (14) and (15),  and part (iii) of
Proposition 1. Stronger preferences for public goods, for one thing, can give rise to a  larger
marginal cost of public funds,  Ti. By part (i) of the proposition, this would  give rise to higher saving
and investment tax rates, and an expansion of the public sector. Parts (ii) and (iii) reflect that
investment and saving elasticities,  as they affect the optimal investment  and saving tax mix, also
impact on the optimal  size of the public sector. Less elastic private investment  demand, reflected  in
a lower value of ev,  for instance,  can explain a higher investmnent  tax and a larger public sector.
Several other determinants  of the optimal investment  tax - and hence the size of the public
production sector - can be mentioned. First, consider that the governnent sector becomes more
efficient, reflected in lower waste parameters o, for public activities with c  <<  Oc.  Such public
efficiency gains enable the government to obtain higher profits from its public projects. Higher
public profits lead to a reduction  in the marginal cost of funds, rI, and ultimately  to a reduction in
the saving and investment  tax rates and the size of the public sector, by part (i) of Proposition  2.
Finally, it is interesting  to consider  that domestic  private projects or firms are partly foreign-owned.
In particular, we can assume that a  fraction a  of all domestic firms is owned by foreigners,
following Huizinga and Nielsen (forthcoming). The foreign ownership of domestic firmns,  other
things equal, renders the investment  tax more attractice (relative to the saving tax), as part of the
9incidence  of this tax then falls on foreign residents. In fact, the optimal  tax problem now implies  the
following  relationship  between  the investment  and saving taxes,
v  = I  z  Cr/  ue,,-  a]  (16)
Pe,
From  (16), we  see that a  higher foreign ownership share,  a,  brings about a  higher
investment  tax, v, for a given  value of r1  (and thus u), if we assume I - e,,u > 0. At the same time,
it will increase the optimal  size of the public production sector. 6
3.  Privatization  in the closed  economy
In the closed economy, the sum of private and public investment  has to be financed by
domestic saving. In this setting, the domestic interest rate and the shadow cost of public capital are
fully endogenous  to the government's tax and privatization policies. Issues regarding the optimal
public investment  have been analyzed  in a closed economy setting by, among  others, Sandmo  and
Dreze (1971). They in fact characterize  the shadow cost of public capital as a weighted  average of
the gross return to private investment  and the net-of-tax return to saving. This section extends the
earlier work on the optimal  public investment to incorporate a privatization  decision. Two results
emerge. First, the findings  that the government sector is "too large" with distorting  capital income
taxation, and that the private sector underinvests continue to hold. Second, the characterization  of
the shadow value of public capital as a weighted average can be modified in an intuitive  way to
account for ongoing  privatization.
In the closed economy,  the tax wedge between the gross return to investment  and the net
return to saving is denoted  x. Equivalently,  the relevant tax can be imposed  on savers or investors.
Below, we assume that a single tax, x, is levied on the return to saving. The net-of-tax  return to
saving then is r -x, while  the cost of capital to investors is r. Again, there is a profit tax rate a rate
z with  0  s  z  s<  zc  1. Note that the saving-investmnent  balance now implies that S  =  Kp  +  T.
For  a  given profit tax z,  the policy variables of  interest are the saving tax rate, the public
investment in the marginal  public project, the size of the state production  sector, and the level of
public goods provision. The government's optimization  problem is stated formally as the following
Lagrangean,
10L =  U(C,, (Y - C) (1 + r - x)  + up (1 - z) IF(K) - (I  +  r)K,  - P) +  V(G) +
I  (x S + op  z [F(Kp)  - (I + r)KpJ + F(Rs *) - (1 + r)kg + P - G)  (17)
The first order conditions  with respect to the policy variables x, Kg(Ci),  c), and G are as
follows,
')  d  dr  - 'dr)=
g dx)  e  - )  =  (18)
U 5 Ko _dr  t  dK  8  (  dF  _ f  )  +  dr  S  (xe'  -K)]  =  (19)
2  9  dKg(O)  LdK/  dK  )  dKr(O)  (
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
2  d  0S
dir  .￿S(xeO  -t  +h(Q)[(1 -Q)4F(K 5 (@)) -(I  +r)Kg(Q) -F(Kp) +(1  tr)K,]]  =0  (20)
V'  (G)-A  =0  (21)
where  e.'  =  q, + p(1-z)5 0N1/S;  and  W, = I  - (I  - z)  oaKp/S,  with (I  - z) oaKp/S  being the
effective, after-profit-tax  share of capital  owned by the private sector  with no privatization.
Eq. (18)-(20) reflect that the saving tax, public investment  and privatization  all affect the
domestic interest rate. Imposing  saving-investment  balance, we find the following  relationships,
dr  e,  dr  I  dKg  dr  Kg  (0)  -Kp
_  =  _  _  _  _  ,  _  _  _  =  _  ____  - . ,_  - = h(4  ...... L h  (0)~~~~ dx  e,(K  /S)  dKg N)  K,ev  + Se°  MK(Q)  dtD  K e  +Se:
Using these relationships  and (18)-(20), we can relate the optimal  saving  tax, x, the shadow
cost of public investment,  dF  / dKg, and the first order condition  guiding  privatization  decisions  to
the marginal cost of public  funds, TI,  as follows,
x  f  (I  [  - zL]  (22)
ON  P eV e.  17
dF5 1  +r  -(  z)  [  ]  (23)
dKg  Pe:VONM  7(I  -<)  F(Kg  (6))  - F(Kp)  + r  -(I  -7)  (K  (|D)  - K,)  (24)
For  q,  >  1,  we have  x >  0 in (22). Interestingly, the expression for x in (22) indicates  that
this saving-investment  tax wedge is negatively  related to the relatively post-privatization  size of the
private sector, p. In words, ongoing  privatization  lowers the optimal  saving-investment  tax wedge,
as it discourages private investment  in newly privatized firms. Next, the expression  for the shadow
cost of public capital, dF / dKg, in (23) implies that this shadow cost is bounded  between  the gross
cost  of capital  in the  private sector,  I  +  r,  and  the  net-of-tax  return to  savings,  I  +  r - x,  if
Y7  >  I . Using (22)-(23), we can express  the cost of public capital, dF / dKg, as a weighted  average
of the two bounds,  1 + r and 1 + r - x, with weights [pe,1(pe,  +  (1 - z) e0)] and [(l  - z)  e,,'(p  ev +
(1  - z) euc)],  respectively.  This  characterization  of  the  shadow  cost  of  public  capital  is  a
generalization  of the main result in Sandmo  and Dreze (1971, eq. 19) to include  both profit taxation
and ongoing privatization.  First note that a higher rate of profit taxation,  z, renders the shadow  cost
of public investment, dF/dKg,  closer to the private cost of capital, 1 + r. Intuitively,  a high profit
tax makes it less advantageous  to raise additional revenue by distorting the private investment
decision relative to the shadow cost of public funds. A large relative post-privatization  private
sector, p,  similarly  moves the cost of capital closer to the private cost of capital. From (15), we
know that a larger relative post-privatization  private sector reduce the stress on investment  taxation
in  the  open  economy. Analogously, in the closed economy the government then reduces the
distortion of private investment  relative to the shadow cost of public capital. It is interesting  to note
that the cost of public capital in the open economy, in particular the gross international  interest  rate
1 + r, can be expressed  also as a weighted  average of the gross cost of private capital, 1 + r + v,
and the net return to saving,  1  + r - u, with equal weights as in the closed  economy.
Next, the government's  privatization  decision is guided by (24). As before, eq. (24) implies
that the public sector only contains those activities where it has an absolute  production  efficiency
advantage if no distorting  taxation  is used, i.e. if x =  0. More realistically,  there is some distorting
taxation with Ti  >  1 in (24). For this case, we can show,
Proposition  3. In the closed economy with 'i  >  1, we have (i)  a  >  0 and (ii) Kg(6) > Kp.
For a proof, see the Appendix. Note that Proposition 3 exactly  corresponds  to parts (i) and
(ii) cf  Proposition 1. In the closed economy, the government thus also optimally  takes on some
12activities where it is relatively inefficient, if the private sector is subject to a positive saving-
investment tax wedge. For the marginal project, the public sector again invests relatively much
capital, because the private cost of capital exceeds the shadow cost of public capital. Privatization
of a public project thus is followed  by a shedding of capital.
4.  Conclusion
This paper has argued that taxation is a  'market failure'  that other things equals render
public production more attractive. The theory of optimal taxation therefore can be extended to
include a positive theory of the optimal  size of the public production sector. This paper is a first
step in establishing  the link between  optimal tax theory and a theory of privatization.  The analysis
has been limited to capital income  taxation. Even in this setting, it will be interesting  to see how
additional determinants  of capital income taxation, such as international  tax competition,  ultimately
affect the optimal size of the public  sector. Leaving capital income taxation  aside, it should  be clear
that there also is a direct link between, say, labor income taxation and privatization.  With few
modifications, the closed economy  model of section 3 can in fact be reinterpreted  as a model of
private and public employment  of labor, and labor income taxation. When recast in this manner,  the
model immediately  yields the plausible implication that public firms tends to be relatively labor
intensive so that a public firm that is privatized will lay off labor. A link between  other areas of
taxation and privatization  policy can also be envisioned. In future work, it is further possible  to be
more explicit about the market failures a-id public failures that together determine the efficient
boundary between the private and public sector in the absence of taxation. In any such model, it
should remain true that a need to impose  distorting taxes on private activity shifts  the demarcation
line between  the two sectors towards  a larger public production sector.
The model has several empirical  implications.  In fact, the model provides  a theoretical  basis
for the common belief that privatization  leads to lay-offs (of either labor of capital). Careful case
studies of privatization  in several countries confirm this (see Galal, et al.,  1994).  The model also
validates other empirical  work that has already been done on the performance  of public  enterprises.
Singh,  Ratha and  Xiao (1994), for  instance, show  for  a  set  of  Chinese provinces that the
productivity of capital in the public sector is positively related to the overall output-share  of private
firms.  The authors argue that this relationship reflect that a  larger private sector offers more
competition to state-owned  enterprises.  The model of this paper, however, can equally  well  explain
;he relationship. Eq. (11) above indeed be checked to yield the theoretical  predication  that output
13per unit of capital in the public  sector is positively related the share of private output  in total output,
if one varies the investment  tax on the private sector. An important  prediction  of the model, which
remains to be tested, is the positive relationship  between the tax burden on the private sector and
the size of the public sector. Undoubtedly,  there is a variety of structural and institutional  factors
that in practice may explain the size of the public production sector. It will be interesting  to see
whether taxation  is one of them.
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16Appendix
Proof of Proposition  1:
(i)  Eq. (11) implies  that
A  = (I  - C)F(Kg())  - (1  + r)Kg  - [F(Kp)  - (1  + r)Kp]  0
Note that with  6  = 0, we have  A>  0,  as the private  investment,  Kp, is distorted by  the
investment tax, v. To see the result, note that d A  / d  = - F (Kg  ())  <  0.
(ii)  From (11) and G > 0, we see that,
F(Kg (0))  - (I  + r)RKg  ()  > F(K,p) - (I  t  r)Kp
The result follows by noting that F (Kp)  - (I  + r)  > 0  from (5).
(iii) Totally differentiating  (11), we find that,
d O  lF l(K,J  - (I  f  )(dK  / dv)
dv  F (Kg  (0))
Proof of Proposition  3:
Defining A as
A =  (1 - C))F(Kg((6))  - (1 + r - ,)Kg(63)  -/F(Kp)  - (I  + r -. )KpJ =  0
with
il  (l  -z)ec
77  Pe.  eep
the proof is parallel to that for (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1.
17Endnotes
1.  See the World Bank (1995), Table A.1,  pp. 268-271. This source provides comparable
data on the share of public production in GDP for 82 countries for the years 1978-91.  The
data relate to non-financial  government  production by firms that generate  the bulk of their
revene from selling goods and services, excluding education, health services, and road
construction  and maintenance  (see p. 26).
2.  See Adam Smith  (1950)  vol. 2, p. 309.
3.  Keynes (1981)  vol. 19, part 2, p. 695.
4.  In (8) the constraints  on the profit tax rate, z, are ignored.
5.  Note that it is possible  that T1 <  1 with optimally z = 0. This occurs if the profits that the
government  obtains  from running public projects with u = 0, v = 0, and eD  = 0 exceed the
corresponding  optimal  provision  of public goods, G. In this instance, optimal  policy implies
x < 0, v <  0 and cD  <  0, which implies that the state sector is "too small". This somewhat
irrealistic case is ignored.
6.  A larger foreign ownership  share a,  however, tends to reduce the cost of public funds,
precisely because part of the incidence of the investment  tax now is on foreign owners.
This tends to lower v. The net effect on the investment tax rate and the size of the public
sector is, therefore, ambiguous.
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